Community Policing in Battle Garb

A Paradox or Coherent Strategy?

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An emerging body of crime and justice scholarship studies recent macro-level changes in criminal justice practices that are incoherent, contradictory, and volatile. Most attempts to make theoretical sense of these contrasting changes come out of penology, the study of punishment and corrections. For example, David Garland, a leading penological scholar, argues that these changes are a signal that the state is no longer able to control crime. He theorizes that as the criminal justice system reaches its capacity to lower crime rates, governments enact divergent and contradictory policies, characterized by programs that emphasize prevention and forming partnerships versus those that stress “enhanced control and expressive punishment.”

Simon, for his part, offers a rather different explanation for this heterogeneity in criminal justice policy. According to Simon, penal modernity as a uniform model has reached its “end game.” As we fold into an era of post-modernity, the traditional guides to punishment, such as rehabilitation, no longer steer policy and practice in any sort of coherent fashion.

The purpose of this chapter is to make sense of a similar sort of incoherence characterizing not corrections but instead the police, specifically community-oriented versus paramilitary policing. While penological scholars have been theorizing the emergence of polar discourses and practices within correcational policy, the study of police has yet to offer such analytical insights. Rather, police studies, for nearly two decades, have been trained toward advocating and evaluating community policing reforms in search of an answer to the bureaucratic question, “What works?” This type of advocacy scholarship, while providing important evaluations of new police practices, has left discussions of major changes affecting contemporary policing undeveloped.

As a result, police studies have not adequately addressed or explained the emergence of both community policing reforms and an array of controversial practices that seem to run counter to the idea of community policing. For example, little academic research or discussion has been devoted to the proliferation of civil asset forfeiture procedures, the expansion of warrantless searches into public housing developments, the deployment of sophisticated surveillance systems, the rapid movement toward policing schools, a host of aggressive tactics characterized as zero tolerance, and the rise and normalization of police paramilitary units (PPUs or SWAT teams).

The last two developments listed, zero-tolerance policies and the rise of paramilitary policing, are of particular importance. As police scholars concentrate on community policing’s democratic reforms, the real world of policing has experienced a more complex program of change, including the growth and normalization of police paramilitary units. It may seem ironic to discuss aggressive, militaristic sorts of policing in conjunction with community policing reforms. However, ethnographic fieldwork and two national surveys demonstrate that the PPU approach to policing has a strong presence in self-proclaimed community policing-oriented departments.

This chapter seeks to confront and make sense of the emergence of two contrasting visions in contemporary policing—one based on a democratic model, the other on a military model. We start out by briefly examining the community and paramilitary policing models, focusing on their dominant themes. We then employ the latest penological literature on developments in social control to place these apparently contradictory phenomena in their larger structural context. While this literature sheds considerable light on this phenomenon, our final analysis questions the commonsense interpretation that community and paramilitary policing are necessarily antithetical.

On close inspection, the simultaneous emergence of these approaches does not necessarily signal an incongruity stemming from a state in crisis. To the contrary, when examining the real-world application of these differing approaches, they exhibit what Rose terms a “strategic coherence.”
Developing Strands of Community Policing

The concept of community policing is renowned for its ambiguity, making clear definitions or generalizations nearly impossible. Our limited objective is to sketch briefly the dominant themes of two different strands of community policing. For the purposes of this discussion, one version of community policing will be referred to as “zero tolerance” or “order maintenance,” and the other as “peace-corps policing” (with an emphasis on citizen empowerment, peacekeeping, and community building). Dividing community policing into two strands is not meant to imply that all police agencies follow either one approach or the other. Our objective instead is to demonstrate that the community policing reform agenda as a whole contains within it differing assumptions and prescriptions aligned with differing ideologies. Before discussing either strand, however, a brief review of community policing’s precursors is needed to demonstrate the origins and preconditions that make community policing socially and politically viable.

Police scholars, public officials, and citizens all praise community policing as an innovative and effective approach uniting the police and citizens in a mutual effort against crime and disorder. Community policing reformers wanted to change the “we/they” attitude inherent in the preceding rational-legalistic professional model. The professional policing model emphasized centralized authority, hierarchical structure, and bureaucratic rationality. Professional police administrators relied on numerical representations of performance, most notably crime statistics and response time, to evaluate officers.

Police officers in the professional model, epitomizing the military-bureaucratic philosophy, were to patrol their assigned areas (beats), look for any law violations, and make arrests. They were not to intervene in any non-criminal matters, only those that offended the criminal code; police rationally reacted to criminal situations. In accordance with this rational-legalistic emphasis, police officers were ostensibly held accountable for their daily activities.

The move to this bureaucratic model is attributed to the rampant corruption and poor supervision of police during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The police had a close relationship with local political regimes and the people they were to police. Administrative control was sorely lacking. Decentralization and close political relationships removed any possibility for supervising daily police functions, thus granting officers nearly complete discretion and leading to widespread abuse of power.

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The gross politicization of the police (and all other governmental agencies) during this time led reformers to devise strategies to distance the police from politicians. Reducing corruption involved removing patronage (political favoritism, nepotism) from the police institution and reformulating the recruitment, selection, training, and retention of police officers. The professional model shifted police authority from local politics to the rule of law and professional edicts.

These rational managerial schemes, however, were not as effective for the police as they had been for American business. The police institution made minimal gains in legitimating themselves with the public they served, and their efforts did not positively affect the crime rate. The inability to decrease crime discredited the rational-bureaucratic model of policing, especially as administrators became aware of the limited effect of speedy response times and increased police presence. It seemed that the only measurable and positive impact the police could generate was the reduction in citizens’ fear of crime. Administrators began to realize that while they can do little to reduce crime, they can manage the image of crime and crime control. Police administrators and other public officials began to focus more on community relations and making people feel safer.

Community policing became a sort of rhetorical panacea for community ills after police administrators and public officials realized that such seemingly effective methods of policing as preventative patrol and efficiency-oriented crime fighting did not reduce crime. Community policing purported to realign police functions to improve citizen satisfaction, reduce fear of crime, and remove the “we/they” attitude epitomized by the military-bureaucratic (professional) model.

Strand One: No Tolerance for Broken Windows

The crux of the first strand of community policing is that crime could be reduced by attending to common disorderly behaviors such as drunkenness, idleness, open-air drug dealing, loitering minorities, homelessness, graffiti artists, peddlers, squeegee men, and so on. This new organizational mandate focused on creating a climate of order in the community by having little tolerance for disorderly behaviors and conditions.

This mandate required the police to get out of their cruisers and take control of their community in order to foster a tighter working relationship with the citizens they served. The “broken windows” thesis, touted by Wilson and Kelling, posited that signs of communal disregard and incivilities
demonstrate that no one cares about the community. The incremental decaying of community life resulted in people seizing upon opportunities to commit crimes after rationally calculating the potential gains and losses from such acts. Wilson and Kelling described the process:

Untended behavior leads to the breakdown of community controls. A stable neighborhood can change, in a few years or even a few months, to an inhospitable and frightening jungle. A piece of property is abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is smashed. Adults stop scolding children; the children, emboldened, become more rowdy. Families move out, unattached adults move in. Teenagers gather in front of the corner store. The merchant asks them to move; they refuse. Fights occur. Litter accumulates. People start drinking in front of the grocery; in time, an inebriate slumps to the sidewalk and is allowed to sleep it off. Pedestrians are approached by panhandlers.

As Wilson and Kelling imply, a healthy community will rapidly deteriorate into a disorganized one as informal social controls (family, church, and schools) weaken. When these informal controls deteriorate, fear of crime increases to the point that many community members hesitate to leave their homes, creating a community characterized by "obstreperous teenagers" that prey upon and frighten the isolated elderly.

Wilson and Kelling led police scholars and public officials to develop methods for the police to govern these disorderly behaviors and the locations in which they occurred. Community policing, therefore, shifted police attention from strict military-bureaucratic administration and centralized organization, concerned with serious crime, to one more interested in reducing criminal opportunities and fostering positive police-citizen relations. By focusing on the broken windows in a location, the police and the community can work together to clean up the community through "linking order-maintenance and crime prevention."

The "broken windows" model, like many theoretical doctrines, made a lot of sense to a lot of people—hence its popularity. As with other commonsense doctrines, however, the real-world application of Wilson and Kelling's approach to community policing has fueled tremendous controversy. It has devolved, in many instances, into a zero-tolerance policing model. Zero-tolerance policing refers to the strict enforcement of all criminal and civil violations within certain geographical hot spots (a code word for lower-income, minority areas) using an array of aggressive tactics such as street sweeps, proactive enforcement of not just the law but "community order," and a proliferation of drug raids on private residences. The best-known example of zero-tolerance community policing developed in the New York City Police Department. This approach, touted as a great success by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, is being replicated in numerous cities across the country through a model they term COMPSTAT. COMPSTAT relies on strict command and control, zero tolerance for indices of disorder in communities, an aggressive attack on problem areas as determined through sophisticated computer analysis, and a tough system of accountability for supervisors to reduce crime.

Strand Two: Police as Peace Corps
Even though zero-tolerance policing operates in several cities across the United States and abroad, it is not the only community policing model. In fact, while Wilson and Kelling emphasized crime control through aggressively confronting disorder, academics such as Louis Radelet and Robert Trojanowicz were promoting a brand of community policing that emphasized community empowerment, cultivating constructive relationships with disenfranchised minority groups, and establishing partnerships between the public and the police. In this strand of community policing, the end goal is for the community to actively police their own communities.

In contrast to zero-tolerance enforcement, this strand envisions citizens sharing information and creating partnerships with the police and other public and private agencies, so that community problems (only one of which is crime) can be approached more intelligently. Police are better able to aid in community building and to establish community-based problem-solving programs by attending to the social and cultural preconditions that make crime more likely.

This style of policing has been theorized as part of an emerging neoliberal strategy that seeks to reduce state responsibility for safety and security. As the public becomes more aware of the criminal justice system's inability to control crime, this type of community policing attempts to empower, activate, and shift responsibility to the citizenry. It assumes that the police are no longer the sole provider of safety; private citizens and other private entities must participate in policing their own communities.

Each of these contrasting models of community policing contains differing ideological assumptions about the role of police in the community. Wilson and Kelling's zero-tolerance model seeks to "clean up" a community proactively, thereby reducing the potential for crime and diminishing citi-
zens' fears, while the other model is concerned with building responsible and knowledgeable communities through police-citizen partnerships. These two strands of community policing often operate side by side within the same department without an acknowledgment of the inherent ideological differences between the two.

Both models, however, do share key features. These include placing a premium on:

- Proactive policing and crime prevention
- Democratic reforms both within the department and with the community they serve
- Less bureaucratization and enhanced officer freedom
- The establishment of trust between the citizens and the police and a reduction in the fear of crime
- A quest to reclaim the neighborhood through an emphasis on policing places (hot spots), as opposed to pursuing individual law violators

**Militarizing the American Police**

Now that the foundation of community policing has been discussed, we can briefly sketch the central aspects of another contemporary and seemingly contradictory police development. Indeed, as the correctional field has seen the emergence of incoherent policies and rhetoric, so has the police institution. Specifically, community policing reforms have been accompanied by a proliferation of police paramilitary units in large, medium, and small police departments.\(^\text{17}\)

Kraska and Kappeler discovered that between 1980 and 1996, the numbers of PPU's nearly doubled in medium to large cities. This growth was ubiquitous. Small jurisdictions (between twenty-five thousand and fifty thousand citizens) experienced a more marked growth: a 157 percent increase from 1985 to 1995; more than 65 percent of small-town departments have a PPU; and almost two out of every ten police officers in small-town agencies are assigned at least part-time to a PPU.\(^\text{18}\)

The increase in PPU activities is even more pronounced. Before the late-1980s drug war, these units were used as high-powered reactive units, typically responding to the rare hostage situation, barricaded suspect, or civil disturbance. This has all changed. Today, about 80 percent of PPU activity is proactive. Specifically, serving search and arrest warrants, most often as no-knock drug raids, accounts for more than three-quarters of all PPU activity.

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In addition, about 18 percent of small, medium, and large police departments use their PPU at least periodically to patrol high-crime neighborhoods. The assignment of these normal, everyday police functions to elite paramilitary squads debunks the image of the stereotypical SWAT team as handling mostly hostile terrorists, crazed barricaded gunmen, or other urban legends.\(^\text{19}\) Kraska and Kappeler summarize their findings:

> Our research found a sharp rise in the number of police paramilitary units, rapid expansion in their activities, the normalization of paramilitary units into mainstream police work, and a close ideological and material connection between PPU's and the US armed forces.\(^\text{20}\)

These units usually comprise ten to thirty-five officers and are modeled directly after military special operations squads such as the Navy Seals or Delta Force. Policing with paramilitary units stresses a centralized organization, tight command structure, regimented training, and military discipline. PPU's operate from an ideology of militarism, which accentuates the use of state force and its accompanying technological tools to solve certain crime and disorder problems—drug possession and dealing behind closed doors, high-crime hot spots, community disorder, civil disturbances, and high-risk situations involving barricaded suspects and hostage taking.

On its face, it might seem inappropriate to discuss community policing reforms and the movement toward militarizing a component of the police together; however, this is what appears to be happening. All the departments surveyed that had an active PPU also claimed to place high emphasis on the democratic approach of community policing. These data, therefore, document the concurrent emergence of two ideologically contradictory police developments. The police institution has simultaneously pursued highly publicized community policing reforms while enacting a less visible transformation based on the military special operations model.

**A Punishment and Social Control Context**

Thus far we have asserted that the democratic reforms of community policing have emerged alongside a rapid expansion of police paramilitarism. These developments, on their face, are ideologically and operationally incongruent. How do we make sense of this seeming paradox? What social, political, and cultural preconditions best explain this contradiction? A need exists to expand our theoretical gaze.
The Military-Police Blur

As noted earlier, correctional scholars have already recognized and theorized similar trends in contemporary practices of punishment. We intend, therefore, to make sense of these recent police developments by extending and synthesizing theoretical approaches offered by several penological scholars. First, we review the "governmentality" approach to viewing social control in society. Second, we examine the reasons given by penologists as to why we have this paradoxical situation. Finally, we use both the governmentality approach and the proposed explanations to help us to understand the paradox between militarization and democratization in policing.

The Governmentality Approach

One axiom of political thought is that governments construct complex programs, technologies, rationalities, and other mechanisms to guide, shape, and steer public thought and action. Indeed, governments have since at least the eighteenth century sought to align the public's sensibilities and activities to those of the dominant political will. While to many, especially those living in "free" democratic societies, this might seem more likely to occur in overpowering socialist regimes, liberal democratic societies also seek to control the citizenry through an assortment of agents, agencies, and institutions, both public and private. In liberal societies, however, the citizenry is afforded a certain level of autonomy and granted civil liberties or rights, not to be violated by the government. This paradox—restricting behavior without offending citizens' rights—has troubled liberal governments since their inception. To confront this paradox, liberal governments have institutionalized several locations (schools, prisons, doctors' offices, and so on) that attempt to implement the needed mind-set (i.e., intellectual or subjective positions) to rule a given population, a mind-set referred to by Foucault as "technologies of the self."

This type of analysis, known in the literature as governmentality studies, helps us to realize that the criminal law is only one mechanism used to order society. In fact, this perspective sees the criminal justice system as playing only a minor role in the complex of control practices. Governments create institutions and experts around vast locales of knowledge that serve to diffuse a government's power or ability to inscribe self-steering mechanisms within individuals in order to govern at a distance. As modernity fostered egalitarianism, proportionality, rationality, and science in society in general, so too were these sentiments included in developing practices of control and punishment. This modern form of control or government sought to align the citizenry less through brute force and disciplines of the body and more through inscribing "technologies of the self" within the majority. This is not to say that bodily forms of punishment ceased, but rather to acknowledge that governments mostly use a complex circuitry of mundane forms of rule to order a given population.

It is the intersections and interactions of a multiplicity of these controls that make possible the maximization of the health, wealth, and morality of a population, and hence the government, of a given territory. These relationships or networks are said to have "governmentalized" the state. In other words, the all-powerful sovereign state loses sway as other, more local centers of power are created (e.g., managers, bureaucrats, teachers, doctors, lawyers, psychiatrists, and other experts of daily life). More importantly, power is defined less as a matter of national territory and more by the government's knowledge of the mass of its population through calculations of births, deaths, diseases, crime, and other areas of control. Liberal governments, therefore, depend on "a whole variety of alliances and lash-ups between diverse and competing bodies of expertise, criteria of judgment and technical devices that are far removed from the political apparatus as traditionally conceived." That is, governments construct many institutions, both state and nonstate, to assist in aligning the aspirations of private individuals with those of the government.

As "good government" entails the coordination of numerous programs in diverse locales, the police institution, similarly, consists of numerous tasks and a variety of discourses and technologies to accomplish those tasks. For this reason, we contend that the police institution makes an excellent site to theorize the criminal justice system with a "governmentality" analysis. The police institution and the criminal justice system in general are merely components of a complex of interconnections and overlappings with various private and public agencies.

As society continues to confront major cultural and political changes (what some call high modernity), these complex intertwinings intensify. One manifestation of this intensification is the previously discussed volatility, ambivalence, and incoherence between its various programs and rationalities. In focusing on trends in punishment, penological scholars see a dislocation in correctional policy and practice characterized by "contradictory couples." These include "disciplinary obedience versus incapacitation, warehousing versus correctional reform, punishment and stigmatization versus reintegration, [and] formal criminalization versus informal victim/offender settlements."
Explaining the Paradox

There has been a good deal of discussion about why exactly this state of incoherence and volatility has emerged. Feeley and Simon emphasize the ascendance of a new statistics-based logic that focuses on managing risks in certain populations; O'Malley asserts that the attempt to combine neoliberal and neoconservative political rationalities accounts for the current state of incoherence; Simon posits that postmodern negativity has replaced more innovative modernist punishments; Garland argues that high crime rates and the criminal justice system's inability to affect them have resulted in a legitimacy crisis for governments. A brief explanation of a few of these theories would be helpful.

Feeley and Simon argue that a new language has emerged in contemporary punishment practices. This language shifts the once individualizing and moralizing gaze of legal discourse into one more concerned with actuarial calculations of risk management, not crime reduction. They posit that the dominance of managerial mentalities shifts focus from concerns of legal due process and discovering guilt to a preoccupation with bureaucratic rationality and system efficiency. The focus on system efficiency and rational, pragmatic penal strategies has displaced the progressive agenda of rehabilitation, signaling an emerging postmodern penalty. According to this framework, the central governmental objective is to maximize resource allocation and properly manage risks of classes of potential offenders.

Feeley and Simon argue that this "new penology" is the effect of significant social and cultural changes. Garland, on the other hand, asserts that "the penal system is only now experiencing a form of management that has long been taken for granted elsewhere." Garland claims that, regardless of the significance of these changes, they should not be considered as signs of a novel sociohistoric transformation. Rather, they are better understood as governmental shifts away from welfare strategies that now stress accountability, auditing, and fiscal controls recognized in other policy sectors.

For Garland, this businesslike ethos is most evident in the devolution of budgets and financial responsibilities as well as the privatization of criminal justice functions (e.g., private police and prisons). Indeed, governments reacted to the many failures of the penal-welfare strategy by embarking on a trend toward downsizing state responsibility for crime control. Governments began incorporating community participation through citizen empowerment programs and civilian empowerment schemes (e.g., community policing). These are all signs of contemporary crime control reaching the limits of the sovereign state. The underlying cause for this governmental response is the normalization of high crime rates in several Western nations. Garland asserts that "high rates of crime have gradually become a taken for granted element of late modern life," prompting a perpetual political ambivalence.

The ambivalence in question is characterized by bipolar crime control strategies—rehabilitation versus retribution or instrumental versus emotive punishments. Governments, in order to face this crime control predicament, have realized the "need to withdraw or at least qualify their claim to be the primary provider of security and crime control." On the one hand, this revelation has fostered the development of pragmatic administrative strategies to improve system functioning (instrumental); on the other hand, this strategy is partnered with a qualitatively different strategy of denying responsibility (passion-driven punishment). Politicians, aware of the consequences of seeming weak or soft on crime, have begun reasserting the state's power to punish through harsh sentences and strict law enforcement.

While Garland contends that the sovereign state has reached its limits to control crime, Pratt and Simon suggest that we are witnessing early indicators of an emerging postmodern penal system. They argue that modern punishment has reached its end game. A "new punitiveness" is emerging in the West, suspending individual rights and liberties, the very essence of modern punishment. The new punitiveness is said to reach beyond modernity itself, employing tactics and retributive and even militaristic schemes (see chapter 7) that are more reflective of a premodern or nonmodern punishment. Simon and Pratt argue that these noble modernist goals have been replaced by distorted representational images of proper social order and security in which reason has given way to emotion.

Contemporary Punishment Studies Applied to Policing

By employing a governmentality framework and the explanations provided as to why this state of incoherence and volatility has arisen in the area of punishment, we can see today's police institution in a much clearer light. Earlier we discussed, for example, the development of numerous controversial police tactics in the war against crime and drugs (no-knock contraband raids, racial profiling, civil asset forfeiture, street sweeps, etc.). These divisive, emotive, and repressive tactics are unfolding alongside community policing reforms that call for helping communities and improving their quality of life. For both Garland and Simon, this incoherence signals that the sovereign state is in crisis. The state is attempting to reassert its traditional power.
while adapting to large-scale cultural and political forces urging it to shed its traditional responsibilities.\textsuperscript{38}

Ambivalence and incoherence are reflected in the two different strands of community policing, which in many ways are at ideological odds with one another. The first model, zero tolerance, is based on neoconservative notions of a strong law-and-order presence. The second strand, what we characterized as a type of peace-corps framework, is a neoliberal approach that emphasizes citizen responsibility, prevention, and partnerships outside the criminal justice system. Although this ideological ambivalence is not always recognized by police academics and practitioners, the numerous debates that center on the desired future direction of community policing—Trojanowicz’s vision versus Wilson’s, for example—parallel the tensions in correctional reforms.

By placing the simultaneous police developments of democratization and militarization within a larger social control context, we can see that they are manifestations of a rapidly changing political and cultural landscape. Their coexistence demonstrates the inconsistencies and contradictions emanating from the state in late modernity. The discovery of a component of the police institution militarizing itself does not, therefore, illustrate the ascendance of state power.\textsuperscript{39} To the contrary, it signals an attempt to maintain a small token of its dwindling prominence within the late modern society’s complex of social controls.

\textbf{Militarization and Democratization Working in Perfect Harmony?}

As reasonable as the aforementioned sounds, there is more to this story. Empirical evidence derived from the real world of police practice complicates our explanation. In short, contemporary police practice may not be as incoherent and contradictory as an initial analysis might indicate.

The empirical evidence connecting paramilitary policing with community policing is overwhelming and is not an organizational secret. Kraska and Kappeler discovered that about two-thirds of the respondents to a national survey of small, medium, and large departments agreed that their police paramilitary units “play an important role in community policing strategies.”\textsuperscript{40} Remember that almost 20 percent of police departments use their PPU’s for proactive patrol work. One participant in this practice made the interconnection clear.

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We conduct a lot of saturation patrol. We do terry stops and aggressive field interviews. These tactics are successful as long as the pressure stays on relentlessly. The key to our success is that we’re an elite crime fighting team that’s not bogged down in the regular bureaucracy. We focus on quality of life issues like illegal parking, loud music, bums, neighborhood troubles. We have the freedom to stay in a hot area and clean it up—particularly gangs. Our tactical team works nicely with our department’s emphasis on community policing.\textsuperscript{41}

This quotation implies that there is no contradiction in having a paramilitary unit implement a central tenet of community policing—creating a climate of order. Another example of what we identified earlier as zero-tolerance community policing comes from an official of a highly acclaimed community policing department.

We’re into saturation patrols in hot spots. We do a lot of our work with the SWAT unit because we have bigger guns. We send out two, two-to-four-man cars, we look for minor violations and do jump-outs, either on people on the street or automobiles. After we jump-out the second car provides periphery cover with an ostentatious display of weaponry.\textsuperscript{42}

Here we have an example of proactively targeting problematic space (hot spots) with roving squads of tactical officers, as opposed to the cop on the beat reacting to calls for service. The hot spot is usually identified using sophisticated geo-mapping computer analysis. This proactive orientation coincides with similar trends recognized by Feeley and Simon in the correctional field, where individualized punishments are being displaced by the “actuarial consideration of aggregates.”\textsuperscript{43} The next quotation, from a chief of police, mimics the ideology behind the governmental program known as “weed and seed” when discussing the role his PPU plays in community policing efforts.

It’s going to come to the point that the only people that are going to be able to deal with these problems [drugs, guns, gangs, and community disorder] are highly trained tactical teams with proper equipment to go into a neighborhood and clear the neighborhood and hold it; allowing community policing and problem oriented policing officers to come in and start turning the neighborhood around.\textsuperscript{44}

Our final quotation illustrates an interesting application of the PPU no-knock dynamic entry approach:
ABC nightly news televised a 14-man PPU from Toledo, Ohio, based on a tip from the neighbor, conduct a no-knock dynamic entry on an average household (in other words, not a crackhouse). With MP5s slug, and in full paramilitary garb, the officers stormed the residence and aggressively threw people on the ground while ransacking the place for drugs. They found what they came for: less than an ounce of marijuana in one of the teenager’s bedrooms. On the grounds of the Clinton Administration’s Housing and Urban Development regulation termed, one strike and you’re out, the police and media were excited to report that the entire family was evicted.45

This program illustrates how even the softer, regulatory aspects of community policing can be intertwined with the hard edge of paramilitary policing tactics. And as with the other quotations, in the realm of practice there is a type of harmony between community policing (at least the zero-tolerance strand) and paramilitary policing, as opposed to a tension or inconsistency. Apparently, some police agencies are integrating a military-model approach—occupy, suppress through force, and restore the affected territory—with community policing ideology, which emphasizes taking back the neighborhood, creating a climate of order, and enacting preventative and partnership strategies. Again, New York City’s style of zero-tolerance community policing is the best-known example. Theoretically inspired by Wilson and Kelling’s “broken windows” thesis, it seeks to maintain high police officer visibility, police-citizen information flows, incorporation of private and voluntary organizations, and the use of aggressive, militaristic tactics.46

Our analysis offers evidence, therefore, that the simultaneous rise of community and paramilitary policing should be seen at least partially as reflecting a consistent logic and coherence, not only volatility, contradiction, or incoherence. One of the foremost governmentality theorists points to our assessment as a real possibility. In arguing against the prevailing view of the criminal justice system as mired in incoherent rationalities and practices, Rose states that

despite their apparent complexity and heterogeneity, contemporary control strategies do show a certain strategic coherence. They can be broadly defined into two families: those that seek to regulate conduct by enmeshing individuals within circuits of inclusion and those that seek to act upon pathologies through managing a different set of circuits, circuits of exclusion.47

Rose goes on to conclude—after examining the consistency, logic, and ties that thread between the various circuits of control—that criminal justice control strategies do have a certain coherence. He rejects any notion that their coherence implies some sort of totalitarian control; his point is merely that seemingly contradictory rhetorics and practices do not necessarily operate in opposition to one another. The community policing/militarized policing paradox seems to be an important example.

Paradox, Strategic Coherence: What Does It Matter?

This chapter has attempted to make sense of the seeming contradiction in the simultaneous rise of police militarization and community policing. In doing so, we have attempted to review the literature about contemporary trends in corrections and policing, examine emerging theoretical frameworks for making sense of these trends, and provide a counterintuitive interpretation of the paradox based on observations of police practice.

We would like to conclude by exploring the implications of our analysis. Several are worth highlighting. First, the police studies literature, as opposed to focusing so heavily on which community policing reforms might work, needs to begin to document and make sense of the numerous controversial tactics emerging alongside community policing rhetoric. This neglect is helping to leave questionable police strategies, such as no-knock contra-band raids and street sweeps, unchecked.

Second, strategies based on the military model and those based on a community policing model can be applied in an ideologically and operationally consistent manner. This may point to some serious shortcomings in the assumptions contained in community policing theory. Is it wise, for example, knowing the history of conservative police ideology and practice in the United States, to base a police reform agenda on the notion of creating a climate of order? Moreover, most would agree that the police have the ability to weed a location; what would make us think that they would have the will or ability to then seed it? At a minimum, our analysis should serve as a warning to well-intended community policing reformers to beware of unintended consequences.

Third, despite efforts by reformers to do away with the military-professional approach of the mid-1900s, the specter of the military model still haunts the real world of contemporary policing. Militarism is obviously an enduring and flexible presence that can adapt to changing external forces. As Haggerty and Ericson demonstrate in chapter 4, the military model can
be influential in the realm of technological and information-based controls as well as the traditional use of force.

Fourth, the paradox-versus-strategic-coherence debate demonstrates that even if shifts in criminal justice policy may seem incompatible, one should not automatically assume that this signals confusion, incoherence, and volatility. Practitioners have the ability to maneuver through the tensions and pressures of external influences. It is not uncommon for them to have to amalgamate contradictory messages so that their real-world thinking and practice exhibit a level of coherence and harmony that makes sense to them. After all, not the administration of justice always been fraught with contradictions through which practitioners have had to navigate? It does appear, however, that the rapid pace of change and intense volatility of late modern society will seriously test their abilities.

Finally, the governmentality framework teaches us that controls based on criminal justice are only a small part of the complex circuits of control characterizing contemporary society; the state's direct power to control citizens is diminishing. We hope that this chapter has demonstrated, though, that the police institution has a remarkable capacity to employ numerous strategies to resist the weakening of its authority. While police departments have embarked on an aggressive campaign to fight wars on drugs, gangs, and crime in poor inner-city communities, they are also intertwining themselves into the public school system as a permanent security, disciplinary, and educational presence. These varying roles of police and citizen might best be seen as reflecting coherence and stability, regardless of their apparently contradictory nature. Foucault's technologies of self and domination come together, often through conflict and rivalry, to form a significant part of the panoply of late modern control strategies.

Notes


3. Simon, “They Died with Their Boots On.”

The Military-Police Blur


25. Foucault, “Governmentality,” 104.


27. These heterogeneous agents and agencies, however, do not always function in a cooperative vacuum. Rather, these programs are often confronted by rivalries and competitions for scarce resources, which increase the likelihood of technologies appearing contradictory. Rose and Miller (“Political Power beyond the State,” 190–91) summarize this possibility for competition: “Government is a congenitally failing operation. Technologies produce unexpected problems, are utilized for their own ends, and are hampered by under-funding, professional rivalries, and the impossibility of producing the technical conditions that would make them work.” These failures and rivalries encourage the discovery of something better and should be seen as contributing to the overall power of government, not in opposition of one another.


32. In this context, welfare refers to the “welfare states” that dominated much of the West at least until the end of World War II. This rationality of rule envisages a public dependent on the state to provide for its well-being “through state planning and intervention in the economy” and “the assembling of diverse mechanisms through which political forces link up a plethora of networks with aspirations to know, programme, and transform the social field” (Rose and Miller, “Political Power beyond the State,” 191–92; see also Rose, “Government of Advanced Liberal Democracies”; “The Death of the Social”; Simon, “They Died with Their Boots On.”, n. 38.


34. See David Garland, Punishment and Welfare (Brookfield, Vt.: Gower, 1985), 93.


